Nuclear Fallout: The Unsettling Implications of the US-Saudi Deal

The proposed nuclear deal between the United States and Saudi Arabia has sparked widespread concern among analysts, policymakers, and regional stakeholders. Announced amidst great fanfare, this agreement has raised alarms about a potential nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

While proponents argue that the deal will serve civilian purposes, many are rightly concerned about Saudi Arabia’s track record on nuclear issues. In 2018, Mohammad bin Salman categorically stated that if Iran developed a nuclear weapon, “without a doubt” the kingdom would follow suit. This statement has been echoed by Israel, which has long been wary of Arab countries acquiring their own nuclear capabilities.

Critics argue that this deal could tip the scales, sparking an arms race across the Middle East. Avigdor Liberman’s scathing assessment is hardly surprising: “Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program will end in nuclear weapons and lead to a mad arms race across the entire Middle East.” The potential risks extend far beyond mere proliferation concerns.

Analysts have raised red flags about possible nuclear leaks amidst the region’s heightened tensions. The recent strikes against Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant served as a stark reminder of the dangers posed by regional conflicts. These incidents did not damage the reactors’ cores, but they underscored the vulnerability of such facilities to attack.

One pressing question is whether Saudi Arabia will have unfettered access to sensitive materials under the agreement’s “black box” clause. Would US contractors truly be able to monitor and control uranium enrichment processes on Riyadh’s soil? Or would this merely create an opportunity for the kingdom to acquire the necessary expertise and technology?

The parallels between this deal and other international arrangements are telling. Washington’s model seems to draw inspiration from Russia’s agreements with Turkey, Egypt, and others in the region. However, there is a crucial difference: Moscow does not enrich uranium in these cases. Furthermore, the UAE’s gold-standard civilian nuclear program imports low-enriched uranium from multiple countries, avoiding the very risks that this deal ostensibly seeks to mitigate.

Matthew Kroenig, a fellow at the Atlantic Council, has expressed his concerns about the two-year joint study aimed at determining whether Saudi Arabia needs its own enrichment facility. This could be little more than a negotiating tactic, reminiscent of past stalling tactics employed by Washington against countries seeking to enrich their own uranium. As Kroenig astutely observes: “The US really means by ‘black box’? So will the US bring its engineers there full time, forever? Realistically, the Saudis will be involved, they will learn the tech, and they could kick out the US in the future.”

In scrutinizing this deal’s implications carefully, it is essential to consider the Middle East’s precarious balance of power. The last thing the region needs is a nuclear arms race. The world would do well to recall the cautionary tales of Fukushima and Chornobyl – grim reminders of what can happen when safety protocols are compromised in the name of expediency or national interest.